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Abstract 
Since 2000, enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems have been widely adopted by large, 
state-owned companies in China. While there is a rich body of literature on ERP 
implementation in western companies, studies of Chinese companies are scarce.  A recent 
exception is a study of seventy seven mostly manufacturing companies in China by Liang et al. 
(2007). They found that high coercive institutional pressures positively affect top management 
participation, which, in turn, positively affect ERP diffusion and the degree of its usage across 
the organisation. However, how the institutional pressures are exercised and what are the 
roles of top management in ERP implementation in complex Chinese companies remained 
open questions, worthy of further examination. The lack of understanding of specific 
conditions and especially dynamics of power relations in ERP implementation motivated our 
in-depth case study of a multi-site ERP system implementation in a large Chinese 
manufacturing company. The data collected from three divisions/subsidiaries shows that their 
implementation of ERP system turned out to have different outcomes. The key issues that 
emerged from the data indicate that the dynamics of power relations between the parent 
company and divisions/subsidiaries, and IT context have had a significant influence on the 
ERP implementation and different outcomes in divisions/subsidiaries.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) system is an enterprise-wide integrated information system 
which helps handle the majority of an enterprise’s functional areas such as manufacturing, marketing 
and sales, supply chain management, accounting and finance, and human resources (Somers and 
Nelson 2003, Monk and Wagner 2006). ERP promises to solve the challenges caused by disconnected 
and uncoordinated business activities by reshaping the business structures and streamlining business 
processes and their associated information and work flows (Davenport 1998, Al-Mashari et al. 2003). 
ERP systems are of particular importance for large and geographically distributed companies. Apart 
from aiming to cut costs and streamline their business processes companies such as Toyota, Unilever, 
and Volkswagen with divisions and manufacturing sites distributed globally, implemented ERP 
systems to achieve more effective centralized control (Goodwin 2004, Randolph & Main 2004). 
Research studies of ERP implementation in large companies therefore focused on issues related to 
globally distributed operations, cross cultural issues and differences due to national cultures (e.g. Koh 
et al. 2006). However, very few studies (e.g. Krumbholz et al. 2000) focused on issues related to 
power relations between the different organisation levels during ERP implementation within a large 
organisation.  
Since 2000, ERP systems have been widely adopted by large, state-owned companies in China 
through Computer Integrated Manufacturing System (CIMS) projects typically initiated by the 
Chinese Government (Quan et al. 2005). The current Chinese state-owned companies normally take 
the form of group enterprise which consists of a number of divisions and subsidiaries. While they 
operate in a single cultural context, these companies do not necessarily have a unique organisational 
culture across divisions and subsidiaries, which may affect ERP implementation. Furthermore, the 
typical ‘top-down’ approach to ERP implementation and the current relationships between a parent 
company and its divisions and subsidiaries (a division is fully controlled by the parent company 
whereas a subsidiary is a joint venture between the parent company and another company) may 
significantly impact on the implementation success. These issues are of particular importance to large 
Chinese companies but are not well understood and are generally underexplored in the literature.  
An exception is Liang et al.’s (2007) study of ERP assimilation and the degree of usage in Chinese 
companies, based on a survey of 77 mostly manufacturing companies. They found that high coercive 
institutional pressures positively affect top management participation directly, which, in turn, 
positively affect ERP diffusion and the degree of its usage across the organisation. While this study 
demonstrated the role of top management in mediating institutional pressures on ERP assimilation in 
Chinese companies many questions remain open. Especially in large companies or enterprise groups 
top management role should be seen within the complex power structures of a parent company and its 
divisions and subsidiaries. The coercive pressures from the top management of the parent company as 
a resource for excising power over subordinates companies can be subject to resistance. During an 
ERP implementation we cannot assume that power relations remain static. Given the degree of 
organisational change resulting from an ERP implementation and the potential impact on centralizing 
control it is more likely that existing power relations will not only impact on but will also be affected 
by the ERP implementation. The dynamics of power relations need to be investigated in-depth 
throughout the ERP implementation.  
Furthermore, studies such as Sumner (1999), Scott and Vessey (2002), Umble et al. (2003), Yusuf et 
al. (2004), and Kim et al. (2005), investigate factors that contribute to the success or failure of ERP 
systems implementation. However, in the context of China, one major factor which may negatively 
influence the ERP implementation is inadequate IT infrastructure and the lack of information systems 
(IS) experience (He and Brown 2005, Zhang et al. 2005, He 2004).  
The lack of understanding of specific conditions and especially dynamics of power relations in ERP 
implementation in large Chinese companies motivated our in-depth case study of an ERP 
implementation in a large manufacturing company. The observed ERP system implementation in the 
two divisions and a subsidiary of the manufacturing company had significantly different outcomes. By 
drawing from this study, in this paper we aim to explain how top management support, dynamics of 
power relations and IT context and IS experience influenced the ERP implementation and its 
outcomes. We use the lens of power theory and perspective of IT context to analyse the data (semi-
structured interviews and textual materials - documents, website and e-mails) to explain the different 
outcomes of ERP implementation in the same company.  
This paper is arranged as follows. We begin with a review of literature on top management support in 
ERP implementation, power relations and IT context and IS experience. The second section presents 
research methodology, followed by a third section on results and discussion of the study. Conclusion 
and future research are discussed in the last section.  
2 LITRATURE REVIEW 
2.1     Top Management Support in ERP Implementation 
The expected benefits of implementing ERP systems are manifold, including productivity 
improvements, improved decision making and planning, and supporting enhanced business growth 
(Shang & Seddon, 2002). However, ineffective implementation and use of ERP systems has been 
reported frequently (Zhang et al. 2005, Al-Mashari et al. 2003; Boersma & Kingma 2005). Many 
studies have identified a number of critical success factors, such as top management support, 
communication, training and education, project management and etc. (e.g. Al-Mashari et al. 2003, 
Umble et al. 2003, Yusuf et al. 2004). Among all these factors, top management support was 
considered as one of the most important.  
Top management is critical because they are the primary human agency that “translates external 
influences into managerial actions such as changing organisational structures and establishing policies 
based on their perceptions and beliefs of institutional practices” (Liang et al. 2007, p.63). Top 
management typically develops and promotes a vision for the enterprise’s IT infrastructure and the 
role of ERP system, and is also responsible for harnessing the energy and creativity of employees 
(Bingi, et al. 1999, Al-Mashari et al. 2003, Umble et al. 2003). The outcomes from many studies seem 
to support the claim that when top management supports an ERP implementation it is more likely to 
succeed. Conversely, if no or little support is provided, the implementation is likely to fail 
(Akkermans & van Helden 2002).  
2.2     Power Relations 
Although there has been an increase in IS research paying attention to the organisational context, 
there have been fewer studies of the roles of power and politics in IS compared to other research 
interests (Goodwin 2004, Randolph & Main 2004). Doolin (1998) argued that “technology is both a 
condition and a consequence of power relations in organisations and society”. In order for ERP 
research to be relevant, the practices of ERP implementation and use need to be analysed in the 
context of a wider set of social and power relations. 
Giddens (1979, p. 69) defines power as the transformative capability of human actions. Power is 
exercised via social resources (e.g. signification and norms). As Giddens (1984, p.15-16) explains:  
Resources are structured properties of social systems, drawn upon and reproduced by 
knowledgeable agents. … Power is not itself a resource. Resources are media through which 
power is exercised, as a routine element of the instantiation of conduct in social reproduction. 
The most obvious form of power is the formal hierarchy represented by the reporting and authority 
structure (Randolph & Main, 2004). Those who control the budget, have an extensive empire of 
subordinates, and have an influential voice, are deemed to be powerful (Bariff & Galbraith 1978).  
However, power relations are always two-way (Giddens ibid.) and subject to change through 
interaction between human agents dynamically. “Those over whom power is exercised are recognized 
and maintained as people who act and could do otherwise” (Doolin 1998, p.307). Those in 
subordinate positions in social systems “are frequently adept at converting whatever resources they 
possess into some degree of control” (Giddens ibid., p.142-3). Power is always subject to resistance. 
Those subject to power can mobilise other social resources in a contribution to power relations 
through resistance (Barbalet 1985). Resistance limits the effects of power and in doing so materially 
influences the dominant power (Barbalet ibid.).  
The implementation of an information system is found to cause the perception of power redistribution 
(Randolph & Main 2004) and power losers may resist the implementation (Sillince & Mouakket 1997, 
Randolph & Main 2004). The forms of the resistance observed include obstructive resistance (Markus 
1983), conflict (Sillince & Mouakket 1997) or counter-implementation activities (Keen 1981). 
Markus and Pfeffer (1983) identified some indicators of resistance to system implementation, such as 
frequent complaints about the technical problems, parallel operation of the previous system to 
perform the functions the new system was designed to meet, poor cooperation in dealing with 
problems, bad data submitted to the system, insistence that the system did not satisfy the user 
requirements. However, resistance does not necessary take a form of overt opposition. Barbalet (1995, 
p.543) states that “power about which there is consensus must frequently overcome what might be 
called ‘frictional’ resistance which arises from indifference rather than from conscious and active 
opposition”.  
An ERP system which provides universal, real-time access to operating and financial data can be 
viewed as imposing centralized control which involves the centralisation of control over information 
and the standardization of processes, which are qualities more consistent with hierarchical, command 
and control organisations with uniform cultures (Davenport 1998, Goodwin 2004, Randolph & Main 
2004). This would suggest that the context of Chinese companies with Government ownership should 
be conducive to ERP implementation. 
2.3     IT Context and IS Experience 
In recent years, IT penetration has brought both opportunities and challenges for China (Chen et al. 
2007). Low IT maturity of China’s industries and inadequate infrastructure is regarded as a major 
problem for EPR implementation in China (Huang and Palvia 2001, Zhang et al. 2005, He and Brown 
2005, He 2004). Generally enterprises lack a long-term IT strategy, and IT departments/staff (if they 
exist) lack project experience (Huang and Palvia 2001). Chen (2005, p.84) states that implementation 
of ERP in western countries and in China do not start from the same baseline. When implementing 
ERP system, which was one of the most complex enterprise wide IS, Chinese companies without 
much IS experience have to leap over several years of experienced typically acquired by western 
companies in similar situations.  
The IT maturity has significant influence on ERP implementation.  Previous IS/IT experience may 
have the potential to change employee’s view towards IS/IT which will impact on the future IS 
implementation. For instance, Leidner and Kayworth (2006) explained how IT can change the 
organisational culture from the point of view of value conflicts. Once a group experiences a particular 
information system capable of supporting their values, the group members then generalise the positive 
experience with the individual system to IT in general, and they are more likely to use IT strategically 
and innovatively to support group values in the future. As IT is used strategically and innovatively, 
the IT values themselves become part of the user group values (Leidner & Kayworth 2006). In 
contrast, if a company, as in the case of Chinese companies, has no or little IS experience beforehand, 
it is very hard for its members to see the value of IT. Consequently, the value gap between the 
adopting organisation and ERP system may potentially be huge.  
From the literature review, we should expect that top management support would play an important 
role in an ERP implementation; that more hierarchical, command and control type of organisations, 
with uniform cultures, will be more compatible with assumptions embedded in ERP systems and 
therefore will more succeed in its implementation; and that IT immaturity and the lack of previous 
experience with IS will negatively influence an ERP implementation. Our investigation of the ERP 
implementation in the large Chinese manufacturing company however questioned some of these 
claims and confirmed others. The outcomes of the ERP system implementation were significantly 
different in the two divisions and a subsidiary. In this paper we explain these outcomes and the 
differences between them by analysing the nature of top management support, dynamics of power 
relations, and specific IT contexts and IS experiences in these divisions/subsidiary.  
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The objective of this research is to investigate and explore the role and implications of top 
management support, dynamics of power relations and IT context and IS experience on the 
implementation of ERP system within the case company.  An interpretive case study is adopted 
because firstly, it allows us to address ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions rather than testing the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables. Secondly, the influence of organisational 
factors is a context related phenomenon. Walsham (1993, p.4-5) states that interpretive case studies 
aim at “producing an understanding of the context of IS, and the process whereby IS influences and is 
influenced by the context”. 
Case background 
Empirical data were collected in a listed state-owned manufacturing Chinese company ASC (the real 
name disguised to preserve confidentiality) during 2006-7 period. The history of ASC could be traced 
back to 1890s. The Chinese government restructured the company and publicly listed it on the share 
market in late 1990s but maintaining 51% of interest. ASC is one of the largest manufactures of 
special-purpose vehicles and medal hoses, with 10 divisions, four subsidiaries and a number of sales 
offices throughout China, and an annual turnover of approximately 1.2 billion Yuan. At the point of 
data collection, ASC has implemented ERP in two divisions and one subsidiary, all located in the 
same city in China. A centralised IT department at the level of the parent company, namely 
Information Centre, was responsible for the implementation of ERP for all sites.  
Data collection 
Data collection includes interviews, documents and observation and informal discussions. Fifty 
individuals in various positions were interviewed as shown in Table 1. The interviewees were selected 
based on theoretical sampling strategy (Neuman 2006). Key staff who were directly involved in ERP 
project were targeted. Interviews lasted on average one hour each, and were tape recorded or notes 
taken. 
 
Table 1: Type and amount of interviews conducted at ASC (case company) 
Position  Division  A Subsidiary B Division C Information Centre Total 
Senior manager 1 4 - 2 7 
Project manager 2 2 1 5 10 
Implementation staff - - - 8 8 
Middle manager 3 3 2 - 8 
User 7 6 2 - 15 
Consultant - - 2 - 2 
Total 13 15 7 15 50 
 
An interview guide was developed with questions translated to Chinese (which is the native language 
of all interviewees and one of the authors). Although the essence of the interviews is real time 
conversations between the researcher and interviewees to reveal their personal views (Mingers 2003) 
we used the interview guide to ensure that all related issues to this study were covered across the 
company. The interviews were semi-structured and were centred on each interviewee’s involvement 
in, understanding of, and experience with ERP system and its implementation. Different sets of 
interview questions were developed to address the ERP issues related to the role of interviewees. 
Other sources of data collected including documentation (e.g. annual reports, internal publications), 
observations, and informal conversations (via email, telephone and online chatting software). Multi-




All interviews were transcribed. Only relevant part of the interview transcripts and documents were 
translated into English. The transcripts and relevant documents were input into NVivo (qualitative 
data analysis software). The process of data analysis proceeded in two steps. The first step involved 
open coding and thematic analysis of texts (Ezzy, 2002). The empirical data were read through several 
times, analysed and coded, using meaningful code names. They are then organised into hierarchical 
categories by eliminating, combining and subdividing. The second step was theory-based analysis. We 
draw on the lens of power theory and the view of IT context to explain the nature and outcomes of 
ERP implementation in the two divisions and the subsidiary.  Based on this analysis a contribution to 
theory of ERP implementation in Chinese companies is made. 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Case Analysis 
Around 2000, the Chinese Government initiated and promoted the ‘CIMS project’ (Computer 
Integrated Manufacturing System) among big state-owned companies nationally. The Government 
sought to select some big state-owned companies to trial and fund this CIMS project. The experience 
of big companies involved in this project was expected to diffuse along the supply chain so that IT 
innovation would be promoted throughout the industry in China. ASC was selected by the 
Government as one of the several companies to embark on the CIMS project trial in 2001. The 
Government invested partially in the project and encouraged these trial companies to invest additional 
money themselves in order to adopt the ERP systems. The implementation approach was ‘top-down 
pushing’ from the Government to the parent company, then to divisions/subsidiaries.  
Although the major motivation for ERP adoption was coming from the Government, the top 
management of the ASC parent company had some managerial objective of their own for this project, 
as CIO explained: 
“Our objective of the ERP project in the near future is to standardise the management of all 
the divisions and subsidiaries. Those divisions/subsidiaries have too much authority like the 
vassals in the old time. We don’t know what they are doing and their real business and 
operational situation. ” 
 
In 2001, the ERP project, a multi-phased implementation of Oracle modules, was launched in ASC. 
Division A was selected as the pilot for the ERP implementation, followed by Subsidiary B, and 
Division C.  
 
Division A 
Division A was selected for the first trial because its top management reports directly to the ASC 
management board and the fact that the CIO of ASC was a former general manager of Division A. 
The ASC CIO believed that his prior relationship with the Division A would help the implementation 
process: 
“I knew most of the current senior managers of the division very well and it is more likely to 
get their supports than in other division/subsidiary. Besides, if necessary, I can put some 
pressure on them because of my longevity.” 
Division A did not have an on-site IT department before ERP implementation. The employees had 
limited exposure to IT and only a financial software package was utilised in the Accounts Department. 
Thus, outside the Accounts Department IT did not influence their daily work.  
As part of the implementation process, staff from different departments were selected as key users and 
trained. These key users then trained their fellow colleagues to use the system.  
The Division A top management claimed to support the project but they did not drive it nor did they 
engage in the implementation process to ensure the success of the project. They relied on reports 
produced from the middle management related to the progress, including any problems, related to the 
ERP implementation. 
After 10 months of hard work of preparing the data, analysing business processes, configuring the 
system, and one month after the implementation, the ERP system was shut down because of problems 
related to lack of integrity of the data in the system. This was a very serious failure for Division A, 
since the parent company had high expectation of the first trail. In order to clarify the reasons of 
failure, the general manager of Division A wrote a letter to CIO of ASC, and blamed the Information 
Centre implementation staff for not responding immediately and the complexity of the system:   
“On the day when the fault happened, we tried to contact the staff of Information Centre, but 
nobody replied. We think Information Centre should establish a fast feedback system to 
ensure the successful implementation……Since the system has been rolled out, we regularly 
get some system problems. Sometimes, it can cause one day shutdown……The system is 
obviously too complex for us. We believe there must be some potential problems with the 
system. If one operational mistake can bring un-repaired problems and a system shut-down, 
we don’t think this system should be implemented in practice. Otherwise, it is a ‘time bomb’ 
for us.” 
In his response, the CIO of ASC criticised the attitude and ‘old management style’ of the Division A 
top management and insisted they had to learn about the ERP system and understand the need to 
change their work practices in order to gain benefits of the system. As the top management of 
Division A realised this was an unavoidable command from the parent company, they started to 
implement the ERP system again. At the end of 2003, nearly half a year later since its first trial failed, 
the system did function as intended. However, the employees still did not see how ERP helped them 
in their work but, instead, they perceived ERP as a controlling tool deployed by the parent company to 
monitor them as described by a staff from the Division A Data Centre: 
“After ERP implementation, they (the parent company) have even more control over us. I 
don’t know whether they usually check the system or not. But if they want to have a look at it 
(business and operational data), they can know anything that we did. The financial 
information is more transparent. They can check any accounting detail if they would like to. ”  
Subsidiary B 
Subsidiary B voluntarily applied to be the second trial implementation site after the initial failure of 
Division A. The Subsidiary B top management regarded the ERP implementation as an opportunity 
for them to improve their management as explained by the General Manager of Subsidiary B: 
“Firstly, we really want to know our real business operational situation and accurate 
calculation of profits. Secondly, we want to use the system to eliminate the ‘information 
islands’ which we used to have, and foster the information sharing throughout the 
organisation. The third objective is to make the business process standardised and visible, 
especially some key business sectors such as Purchasing Department……Although we do not 
know the ERP system very deeply, we know exactly what the ERP system can or cannot 
enable us to do. Therefore, we have our own objectives towards the ERP implementation, 
unlike other divisions which are forced to implement.” 
Subsidiary B has had significant experience with IS/IT. Subsidiary B was the first in ASC to use CAD 
to assist in product design and, later, they implemented an in-house ‘ERP-system’ (this is what they 
called their system). This system consisted of Finance and Accounting Module, Purchase Module and 
Sales Module. They experienced the real benefits of IS and believe IT is something that they should 
use in their business. When an opportunity arose, they did not hesitate to apply for the implementation 
as justified by the Subsidiary B General Manager: 
“We even did not think about the question of whether to implement it (ERP system) or not. We 
know this is a good system which definitely can help us to improve our 
management……Before this Oracle ERP, we’ve already had an experience with two 
information systems. That’s where we are different from others. It’s natural for us to want to 
use it (ERP).”  
The top management showed their full support and commitment throughout the implementation 
process. As part of the implementation process, the management team attended workshops to discuss 
changes to their business processes and the system configuration. A new department, called Data 
Centre, was established. This Data Centre not only supported the IT operation but was also 
responsible for the data entry for most of business units. In order to achieve better usage of the system, 
the top management further introduced ‘rewarding and punishing’ measures. Every end user had to 
attend and pass the training course before they were allowed to operate the system. Those who 
achieved high marks in the examination were rewarded with bonus. However, if a staff failed the 
examination, s/he has to attend the training until s/he passed the examination. The trained staffs were 
expected to operate the system effectively and the Data Centre checked the system regularly to ensure 
the data were consistent. Employees who made too many mistakes were punished by salary 
deductions. 
ERP implementation in Subsidiary B is considered a success. The CIO of ASC wants to use this site 
as an example for future ERP implementation for other divisions/subsidiaries.  
Division C 
Before ERP implementation, Division C had no experience in IT use and did not have a single 
computer on site. Like Division A, Division C was fully controlled by the parent company. The only 
difference was that Division C did not have a close relationship with the parent company as in the 
case of Division A (the CIO of ASC was a former general manager of Division A). When talking 
about the influence of CIO, the director of the Information Centre said: 
“Our CIO has limited influence on the top management in Division C. …Even though his 
position is higher, those division leaders may not listen to him.” 
Since this is the third implementation in ASC, it was expected that this implementation could be even 
more successful than the previous two since the staff of the Information Centre were more 
experienced. However, that was not the case. When comparing the implementation of Division C with 
previous implementations, an Information Centre member mentioned that: 
“To be honest, their management foundation is quite bad. They did not carefully prepare the 
data that needed to be input into the ERP system, nor did they investigate the business 
processes to optimise them. They implemented the ERP system just to comply with the parent 
company’s request.” 
The top management of Division C however claimed that he supported the implementation. He asked 
the Information Centre to come to implement the system, but objected that they ignored any problems 
arising during the implementation. They selected the staff from the Design Department who were 
young and with some knowledge about the technology to be in charge of the project. However, there 
was not enough preparation done before going live. Furthermore, no formal training was given to the 
users and they did not understand how to use the system. Thus, the users were confused with the 
functionalities of the system. As a result, the system had too many errors and unfixed problems and 
became un-operatable. The users stopped using it and went back to their old practices. 
One of the members in the ERP project expressed his opinion in the ERP implementation: 
“Our manager does not really care about the system and the project. We don’t think the system 
is quite useful for us. Within the whole division, I am the only one responsible for the 
implementation. Without their (top management) support, I can hardly make other people listen 
to me……We lack people who are familiar with IT and capable to do this thing. I am not the 
right person. Even if I were an IT expert and knew everything about the system, so what? 
Nobody cares about that. But product design is different, it’s a real technique and skill……I 
cannot see the future of using the system. I feel I am wasting my time.” 
4.2 Discussion 
The major issues that show the differences of ERP implementation cross the three sub-cases are 
summarised in Table 2.  
Table 2: Comparison of three ERP implementations in ASC 
 Division A Subsidiary B Division C 
Top 
management 
support view & 
participation 
 ERP perceived as an 
operational tool 
 Some support but no 
commitment   
 ERP perceived as a 
management tool 
 Full support & 
commitment  
 ERP perceived as not 
useful and a time-
consuming burden 
 Virtually no support 
Power relations  More dependent on 
parent company 
 Strong pressure from the 
CIO of ASC 
 Hidden resistance from 
the Division top 
management 
 More independent from 
parent company 
 Little pressure from the  
CIO of ASC 
 No resistance perceived  
 More dependent on 
parent company 
 Little pressure from the 
CIO of ASC 
 Resistance from the 
Division top 
management 
IT context  Little IT experience 
 IT department created to 
manage ERP 
implementation 
 Significant IT experience 
 IT department as a core 
of business operation, 
was in charge of ERP 
implementation and use 
 No IT experience 
 No formal IT 
department 
Prevailing belief “At least, we are still using it 
(ERP) now.” 
“We are quite successful in 
ERP implementation.” 
“I cannot see the future of 
using the (ERP) system.” 
 
Table 2 indicates the diverse outcomes of the ERP implementation in two divisions and one 
subsidiary. The outcomes can be explained by understanding their different forms of power relations 
with the parent company, and their different IT contexts. 
Among the three sub-cases, Subsidiary B which was comparatively more independent and over which 
the parent company had less control turned to be the most successful in ERP implementation. This is 
unexpected as the pressures from the parent company could not have been very effective. An 
explanation why this was the case is Subsidiary B’s significant IS experience and positive attitude 
toward IT. Namely, during the past 15 years, the Subsidiary B has kept exploring the possibility of 
applying IT into and innovating their operations and management. During this process, IT has 
gradually changed the culture in terms of the values associated with IT set by the subsidiary. Both the 
top management and employees believe IT/IS is a necessary tool to support business operations and 
improve existing management. As a result, when the parent company forced all the 
divisions/subsidiaries to implement ERP system, although subsidiaries were less pressured than 
divisions, the top management of Subsidiary B took this as an opportunity for management 
improvement. The positive values towards and good understanding of IT/IS enabled the top 
management to see the potential benefits offered by ERP. Therefore, during the implementation, the 
top management took active participation and provided extensive support and facilitation. 
Given the power structure of ASC, it was expected that ERP implementation in divisions should be 
more efficient than in subsidiaries, because the management and control from the parent company 
were more direct, and divisions were more likely to follow the parent company’s decisions and 
pressures. However, in the case of ASC, the analysis shows an unexpected result. Both Division A 
and C expressed some form of resistance to avoid the implementation. This can be explained by the 
perceptions by the top management of Divisions A and C that with the ERP they would be more 
effectively controlled and would in effect lose power. The declared intention of the parent company to 
adopt ERP system in order to place business activity under scrutiny and to persuade 
divisions/subsidiaries to confirm to ‘normal’ work practices defined in ERP system, could have been 
seen as the intention of the parent company to get even stronger control over its subordinates. This 
action, it was suspected, would potentially change the existing power structure within ASC, and 
subject divisional top management to a more efficient surveillance and control by the parent top 
management. Furthermore, the insufficient IT context also contributed to the resistance by the top 
management of divisions. This is particularly true in Division C, employees valued the manufacturing 
technology and professional skills much more than IT knowledge and skills. When implementing ERP 
system, this became an obstacle for the top management to understand and to learn the complex ERP 
system. Consequently, it was very hard for them to see the benefits of ERP for their division.  
The forms of resistance in the two divisions A and C were however different. In Division A, the top 
management did not openly reject the system but kept telling the parent company about the technical 
problems and mismatches of the user requirements and the ERP; they nominally supported the 
implementation activities (e.g. training), but in fact did not care much about the effects of the training, 
which eventually led to inappropriate data and the failure of ERP use in their first trial. They hid their 
resistance basically because of the strong pressure from the ASC CIO. In contrast, Division C which 
was less pressured by the CIO, resisted the ERP implementation more overtly by mostly ignoring the 
ERP implementation. Although Division C was the third to implement ERP, expected to profit out of 
the accumulated experience by IT staff from the parent company (acquired during implementations in 
Division A and Subsidiary B), its outcome turned out to be the worst.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The literature on ERP research in China suggests that Chinese culture has a significant impact on ERP 
implementation. In most cases, the conflicts between Chinese culture and values in ERP system may 
lead to failure of ERP implementation (Xue et al. 2005). However, our case study did not confirm this 
claim. As the above analysis shows, the ERP implementation within the same Chinese context, and 
the same organisational context (ASC), had different outcomes. We demonstrated that power relations 
between the parent company and its divisions/subsidiaries and the respective IT context/IS experience 
can make a key difference.  
Drawing on power theory and the perspective of IT context, and the extant literature on ERP 
implementation, we showed how power relations and IT context influenced the multi-site ERP 
implementation in a large group enterprise in China. The data collected from three 
divisions/subsidiaries in ASC, the Chinese manufacturing company, show some unexpected results.  
The two divisions which were more dependent on the parent company thereby, expected to more 
closely follow the orders from the parent company’s top management, turned out to more or less 
covertly resist ERP implementation. Consequently, they implemented the system but the functions of 
the system were not used properly. The form of resistance in the Division A was more covert as its top 
management pretended to support and actively engage in the implementation. It can be named covert 
obstructive resistance, which is similar to Markus’ case (1983). The form of resistance in the Division 
C was more overt but still did not escalate into an open conflict with the parent company. The 
Division C top management used the technical problems, the misfit between the ERP and their 
production structure and processes, and the fact that the system did not satisfy their requirements as 
resources to counteract coercive pressures by the parent company (Barbalet 1995, Markus & Pfeffer 
1983). The top management of Subsidiary B, on the other hand, which was more independent of the 
parent company, was more committed to the ERP implementation and ultimately successful.  
Our analysis shows that the combined influence of power relations between the parent company and 
divisions/subsidiaries, and the respective IT context and IS experience caused three different 
outcomes of the ERP implementation.  Coercive pressure by the parent company’s top management 
was not shown to lead to higher divisional top management support. This is because of the relational 
two-way nature of power relations and abilities of divisional top management to mobilize resources to 
resist parent company’s coercive pressures.  
This study contributes to two well established streams in the literature: studies that explain the multi-
site ERP implementation and those that investigate ERP implementation in a Chinese context. This 
study is expected to be of interest to practitioners, especially the top management of large group 
enterprises. Understanding the power relations and enhancing a positive IT value throughout the 
whole group enterprise is very important for the parent company which could enable implementation 
to be more effective, as it can be managed when understood.  
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